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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Spencer Newell Breese challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress.  In its brief, the State does not take issue with Mr. Breese’s statement of the 
facts or the controlling law, but contends the district court did not err in concluding that 
the Greyhound employee who searched Mr. Breese’s backpack was not acting as a 
government agent at the time of the search, and that the search was supported by 
probable cause and was thus authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement.  The cases relied upon by the State do not supports its position 
and its argument should be rejected.  The district court erred in its legal conclusions and 
its decision should be reversed.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Breese relies upon the statement of facts and course of proceedings included 
in his opening brief. 
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ISSUE 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Breese’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Mr. Eversull’s Search Of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Implicated Mr. Breese’s Rights 
Under The Fourth Amendment Because Mr. Eversull Was Acting As A 
Government Agent At The Time Of The Search 
 
 In his opening brief, Mr. Breese argued the district court erred in concluding that 
Mr. Eversull’s search of his backpack was a private search that did not implicate his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Mr. Breese 
asserted that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of the search 
because Corporal Lipple knew of and acquiesced in the search and because 
Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement efforts.  (App. Br., pp.6-10.)  Under 
State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512 (Ct. App. 1994), these are the “two critical factors” that a 
court must consider in determining whether a person conducting a search is acting as a 
government agent.  The State agrees that Kopsa provides the proper test, but the State 
misreads—and hence, misapplies—that test.  Because Corporal Lipple knew of and 
acquiesced in the search, and because Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement 
efforts, Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent in conducting the search, and 
the search thus implicated Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
 In its brief, the State asserts: 
As noted in Kopsa, “It is firmly established that evidence obtained through 
a private search, even though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable 
under the fourth amendment unless governmental officials instigated the 
search or otherwise participated in a wrongful search.”  126 Idaho at 517, 
887 P.2d at 62.  Thus, if law enforcement instigates a search or 
participates in a wrongful search, a finding that the first factor is satisfied 
may be appropriate.  Such a finding is not appropriate in this case 
because the search of Breese’s bag was neither instigated by Corporal 
Lipple nor otherwise wrongful. 
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(Resp. Br., p.11.)  The Court of Appeals did not hold in Kopsa that law enforcement 
must instigate or otherwise participate in a wrongful search in order for that search to 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.  Instead, the Court held in Kopsa that in addition to a 
situation where a law enforcement officer instigates or otherwise participates in a 
wrongful search, the Fourth Amendment is also implicated where a private party acts as 
a government agent in conducting a search.  The Court first explained: 
It is firmly established that evidence obtained through a private search, 
even though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable under the fourth 
amendment unless government officials instigated the search or otherwise 
participated in a wrongful search.  However, where a private party acts as 
an instrument or agent of the state in effecting a search or seizure, fourth 
amendment interests are implicated . . . . 
 
Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 517 (citations omitted).  The language quoted by the State 
represents the beginning, not the end, of the analysis.  The Court went on to explain 
that there is a “gray area” between the extremes of overt governmental participation and 
the complete absence of such participation.  See id.   
These “gray area” inquiries can best be resolved on a case-by-case basis, 
consistently applying certain principles.  One of these principles is that de 
minimus or incidental contacts between the citizen and law enforcement 
agents prior to or during the course of a search or seizure will not subject 
the search to fourth amendment scrutiny.  The government must be 
involved either directly as a participant or indirectly as an encourager of 
the private citizen’s actions in order to bring those actions within the 
purview of the fourth amendment.  In analyzing whether the person 
conducting the search is acting as a government agent, two critical factors 
must be considered: (1) government knowledge and acquiescence, and 
(2) the private party’s intent in making the search. 
 
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  The question, then, is not whether Corporal 
Lipple instigated or otherwise participated in Mr. Eversull’s search; the question is 
whether Corporal Lipple was involved in the search either directly as a participant or 
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indirectly as an encourager.  It is clear from considering the two critical factors—
government knowledge and acquiescence and the private party’s intent in making the 
search—that Corporal Lipple was involved indirectly as an encourager in the search of 
Mr. Breese’s backpack.  
 
1. Corporal Lipple Knew Of And Acquiesced In The Search Of Mr. Breese’s 
Backpack 
 
 In his opening brief, Mr. Breese argued that Corporal Lipple knew of and 
acquiesced in the search of Mr. Breese’s backpack.  In response, the State argues that 
“Breese’s argument fails because it is premised upon how the dictionary defines 
‘acquiescence’ rather than the meaning behind the word as it is used in the context of 
the two-factor test.”  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  The State reads the term “government knowledge 
and acquiescence” as meaning more than the sum of its two parts, but does not cite any 
case law or other authority supporting its position.  Corporal Lipple knew exactly what 
Mr. Eversull was doing as he was doing it, and made no effort to discourage it.  This 
constitutes knowledge and acquiescence in the context of the two-factor test.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding search of hotel 
room “obviously met” the first requirement where, among other things, two police 
officers “were personally present during the search, [and] knew exactly what [the hotel 
employee] was doing as he was doing it”).   
 The State argues that any “acquiescence” by Corporal Lipple was “not legally 
meaningful” because “Corporal Lipple had no authority to prevent Eversull from doing 
precisely what Greyhound policy allowed him to do.”  (Resp. Br., p.11.)  Mr. Breese 
acknowledges that Corporal Lipple could have searched his backpack without a police 
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officer present, and that such a search would not have implicated his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment.  The question here is not one of authority.  Instead, the question is 
whether Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of the search.  
Corporal Lipple’s acquiescence is legally meaningful in resolving this question.   
 In considering whether the government acquiesced in the search of Mr. Breese’s 
backpack, it is significant that this was not a one-time occurrence.  Mr. Eversull testified 
that when a Greyhound employee suspects illegal substances in checked luggage “[t]he 
only thing we do is lock down the buses and call the police, law enforcement.”  
(Tr., p.16, Ls.3-7.)  When Mr. Eversull was asked if he opened the backpack before 
Corporal Lipple arrived, he answered, “No, sir, I do not do that.”  (Tr., p.24, Ls.21-23.)  
Mr. Eversull testified that he initially requested assistance from Officer Wall, who “has 
come in [ ] the past on several drug busts like that, [and] has also come down and done 
training with his dog on those buses . . . .”  (Tr., p.32, L.24 – p.33, L.5.)  The district 
court noted it had heard testimony from Mr. Eversull in another case involving the 
discovery of an illegal substance in checked luggage on a Greyhound bus.  See State v. 
Lovely, 159 Idaho 675 (Ct. App. 2016).  (R., p.77, n.2.).  On these facts, the district 
court erred in concluding that the government did not know of and acquiesce in the 
search of Mr. Breese’s backpack.   
 
2. Mr. Eversull Intended To Assist Law Enforcement Efforts In Searching 
Mr. Breese’s Backpack 
 
In its brief, the State asserts that “Eversull’s testimony, and the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing, supports the conclusion that Eversull’s intent in 
searching Breese’s bag was pursuant to Greyhound policy and not for the purpose of 
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assisting law enforcement.”  (Resp. Br., p.13.)  Mr. Eversull testified that “as a 
Greyhound employee, [he] can search the bag at any time” and that a person who 
travels with illegal substances in his checked luggage is “not allowed on Greyhound 
property or on buses.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-17; p.31, Ls.16-18.)  But Mr. Eversull also 
testified that he wanted a law enforcement officer present when he searched 
Mr. Breese’s backpack because he “never know[s] what the quantities are going to be.”  
(Tr., p.18, Ls.20-21.)  When questioned, Mr. Eversull stated the quantity does not make 
a difference to Greyhound, but “would be a difference . . . on what the law enforcement 
is going to do with it.”  (Tr., p.37, L.23 – p.38, L.3.)  It cannot reasonably be disputed 
that when Mr. Eversull contacted the Boise Police Department, he intended to assist law 
enforcement efforts by identifying an individual whom he believed to be in possession of 
an illegal substance.  This satisfies the second factor of the two-factor test. 
 
B. The Search Of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Was Not Authorized Pursuant To The 
Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement Because It Was Not 
Supported By Probable Cause 
 
In his opening brief, Mr. Breese argued the district court erred in concluding that 
the search of his backpack was supported by probable cause.  In response, the State 
asserts that because the smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause 
requirement, citing State v. Gonzales, 117 Idaho 518 (Ct. App. 1990), and because law 
enforcement can rely on information provided by citizens for purposes of establishing 
probable cause, citing State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961 (Ct. App. 2004), the smell of 
marijuana by a citizen can establish probable cause.  (Resp. Br., p.16.)  The State’s 
argument is not supported by Gonzales and Van Dorne. 
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In Gonzales, the Court of Appeals held that probable cause for a search exists 
where a trained officer detects the smell of marijuana.  117 Idaho at 519.  The Court did 
not hold that probable cause for a search exists where an individual who is not a trained 
officer detects the smell of marijuana.  In Van Dorne, the Court of Appeals held that 
under the collective knowledge doctrine, information obtained from a citizen can be 
imputed to an officer for purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion.  139 Idaho at 
965.  The Court did not hold that an officer can rely on information obtained from a 
citizen (in this case, the odor of marijuana) where the information is dispelled by the 
officer’s own observations (in this case, a failure to detect an odor of marijuana).  What 
we have here is not collective knowledge, but contradicted knowledge.    
The State also contends that “[i]f Eversull’s acts are going to be attributable to 
law enforcement, his experience in detecting marijuana should be as well.”  (Resp. 
Br., p.16.)  The State does not cite any authority in support of this proposition.  The fact 
that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent in searching Mr. Breese’s backpack 
does not mean that Mr. Eversull was in fact a government agent for all purposes.  
Mr. Eversull could not have placed Mr. Breese under arrest, or given him the warnings 
required pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The two inquiries—
whether Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent and, if so, whether the search 
of Mr. Breese’s backpack was supported by probable cause—are factually and legally 
distinct.  Looking at the second inquiry, the totality of the circumstances known to 
Corporal Lipple at the time of the search, including the fact that he did not smell 
marijuana emanating from Mr. Breese’s backpack, would not give rise in the mind of a 
reasonable person to a fair probability that contraband would be found in that backpack.  
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This is the test for probable cause, see State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012), 
and it is not satisfied here. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief, 
Mr. Breese respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the 
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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